Federal Court Rejects Anonymity for Genderqueer Trans-Masculine Plaintiff in Employment Discrimination Lawsuit
“The Court is mindful that coming out is a delicate process, and that LGBTQ individuals may feel comfortable disclosing one aspect of their identity but uncomfortable disclosing another. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s very public coming out as genderqueer undermines their arguments about the harm that would be caused by disclosure of their trans-masculinity.”
U.S. District Judge J. Paul Oetken, himself an out gay man, has granted a motion by the defendants in an employment discrimination case to lift an order he had previously issued allowing the plaintiff in the case to proceed anonymously as “Jamie Doe.” Doe v. Fedcap Rehabilitation Services, Inc. Judge Oetken gave the plaintiff 14 days to decide whether they intend to proceed with this suit using their real name.
The plaintiff identifies as “genderqueer and trans-masculine, with preferred pronouns of ‘they,’ ‘their,’ and ‘theirs,” wrote the judge. The defendants include Fedcap Rehabilitation Services, a non-profit that assists people in completing their education and making a transition into the workforce, and two of its supervisors. “Doe” alleges that “the Defendants discriminated against Doe based on Plaintiff’s disability (breast cancer, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder), sexual orientation (queer), and gender (gender non-conformity/genderqueer/trans-masculine). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for exercising their rights under the Family Medical Leave Act. Plaintiff has since left Fedcap and found new employment.” Thus, the complaint includes both federal and state law claims.
Upon filing the lawsuit, Doe had moved ex parte to proceed under a pseudonym. The court granted the motion without prejudice to the Defendants’ right to seek lifting of the order, which they have now done.
The starting point for the court is Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “all the parties” be named in the title of a Complaint. The 2nd Circuit, which has appellate jurisdiction over cases filed in the Southern District of New York, has ruled that this requirement “serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly.” That court has commented, “When determining whether a plaintiff may be allowed to maintain an action under a pseudonym, the plaintiff’s interest in anonymity must be balanced against both the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant.” The 2nd Circuit has identified a non-exclusive list of ten different factors that courts might consider in conducting such a balancing test.
The plaintiff identified four harms if their name is revealed in this litigation. Plaintiff says their trans-masculinity is an “intimate detail” that they don’t want to disclose through the public record; that “outing them” as trans-masculine would compound the trauma they have already suffered from the defendant’s discrimination; that “genderqueer individuals suffer disproportionately from discrimination” and “outing” them in this way would place them “at further risk of discrimination by employees at their new job,” and finally that, as a parent of school-age children, plaintiff is concerned that disclosing their identity may expose their children to bullying.”
The defendants identified three types of prejudice to them if plaintiff is allowed to proceed anonymously. First, the “non-trivial cost of sealing or redacting court filings;” second, that “anonymity might allow Plaintiff to make accusations that they would not have made if their identity were publicly known;” and third, “Defendants contend that anonymity creates an imbalance when it comes to settlement negotiations.” The defendants, who are not anonymous, may feel public pressure to settle the case in order to avoid bad publicity, while an anonymous plaintiff might “hold out for a larger settlement because they face no such reputational risk.”
Judge Oetken concluded that the case “presents no particularly strong public interest in revealing Plaintiff’s identity beyond the ‘universal public interest in access to the identities of litigants,’” which he remarks is “not trivial.” But the public interest would not be “especially harmed if Plaintiff proceeded pseudonymously.”
However, wrote the judge, “The key issue here is the extent to which Plaintiff has already revealed their gender and sexual orientation to the general public. Defendants point to Plaintiff’s voluntary participation in a news story for a major news outlet. In the story, Plaintiff used their real name, identified as genderqueer, and revealed other details about their gender non-conformity. The article also featured a photograph of Plaintiff, and the picture specifically illustrated Plaintiff’s non-conformance with gender norms.” Thus, the defendants argued, Doe had already voluntarily disclosed “the sensitive issues they seek to keep secret in this case.”
Doe disagrees, saying they have revealed their sexual orientation but not their gender identity, particularly their identity as “trans-masculine,” which would be disclosed if they have to proceed under their real name in this lawsuit. But this argument did not persuade Judge Oetken, who wrote, “But while that is true, the news story still shows that Plaintiff was comfortable with putting their gender-non-conformity in the public eye. The Court is mindful that coming out is a delicate process, and that LGBTQ individuals may feel comfortable disclosing one aspect of their identity but uncomfortable disclosing another. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s very public coming out as genderqueer undermines their arguments about the harm that would be caused by disclosure of their trans-masculinity.”
The court concluded that the issue was “whether the additional disclosure of Plaintiff’s identity as trans-masculine would so harm Plaintiff as to outweigh the significant prejudice to Defendants and the public interest in access to the identities of the litigants. Plaintiff has not met that significant burden.” Judge Oetken suggests that Plaintiff wants “what most employment-discrimination plaintiffs would like: to sue their former employer without future employers knowing about it,” but that is not how the civil litigation system is set up. “Defendants — including two individuals — stand publicly accused of discrimination and harassment, including detailed allegations of misconduct. Defendants do not have the option of proceeding pseudonymously,” commented Oetken. “Allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously would put Defendants at a genuine disadvantage, particularly when it comes to settlement leverage. Courts allow such an imbalance only in unique circumstances, and Plaintiff has not shown that this is one of those special cases.”
While acknowledging that the disclosure of Doe’s trans-masculinity “would be difficult and uncomfortable,” wrote the judge, “this alone is not enough to demonstrate the exceptional circumstances required to proceed pseudonomously, especially in light of Plaintiff’s public identification as genderqueer.”
Compare this decision to Doe One v. CVS Health Corporation, and Doe v. Spencer Cox Clinic, in which the district courts granted motions for HIV-positive plaintiffs to proceed anonymously in lawsuits against pharmaceutical industry defendants and several hospitals and a medical clinic over alleged unauthorized disclosure of medical records. Courts generally consider HIV-status in medical records to deserve the kind of confidentiality treatment that the plaintiff in the instant case was seeking for their trans-masculine identity information.
Doe is represented by Brittany Alexandra Stevens of Phillips & Associates PLLC, and Marjorie Mesidor of Phillips & Phillips PLLC. Attorneys from the law firm of Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., represent the defendants.